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CALIFORNIA APPLIES NEGLIGENCE
PRINCIPLES IN DETERMINING
LIABILITY OF A LAND
OCCUPIER
In the past California has determined the duty owed to some-
one coming upon the land of an owner or occupier' by classifying
the entrant as either an invitee, licensee, or trespasser and by apply-
ing the common law rules pertaining to such status.2 Substantial
criticism has been directed at the use of these common law rules.
Courts and commentators alike have observed the frequent diffi-
culty of accurately labeling the entrant as either an invitee, licensee,
or trespasser. These same authorities have likewise criticized the
use of the entrant's status to fix duty as arbitrary and inflexible.'
On August 8, 1968, the California Supreme Court abolished
these common law rules as determinative of liability in the case of
Rowland v. Christian.4 The court, in a 5-2 decision with Justice
Peters writing for the majority, reaffirmed Civil Code section 1714'
and applied it with reference to the duty owed an entrant by a
landowner.6 Recognizing the confusion that results when courts at-
tempt to apply these common law rules of liability in a modern
setting, the court held that the proper test of liability is whether
the owner or occupier has acted as a reasonable man in the man-
agement of his property in view of the likelihood of injury to others.
The court added that while the entrant's status may be considered
in determining liability, it is no longer conclusive.7
This comment will examine the repercussions of the Rowland
decision, and, more particularly, will analyze the reduced effect of
the entrant's status in determining landowners' liability.
1 When the term landowner is used in the text, it shall be synonymous with land
occupier.
2 Palmquist v. Mercer, 43 Cal. 2d 92, 105, 272 P.2d 26, 34 (1954) (concurring
opinion); Note, 13 CALiF. L. REV. 72 (1924).
3 See, e.g., Palmquist v. Mercer, 43 Cal. 2d 92, 103, 272 P.2d 26, 33 (1954) (con-
curring opinion); Hanson v. Richey, 237 Cal. App. 2d 475, 478, 46 Cal. Rptr. 909, 911
(1965) ; Fernandez v. Consolidated Fisheries, Inc., 98 Cal. App. 2d 91, 96, 219 P.2d
73, 76-77 (1950) ; James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to
Licensees and Invitees, 63 YALE L.J. 605, 610 (1954); Note, 22 S. CAL. L. Rv. 318,
320 (1949) ; Note, 13 CALnI. L. REV. 72, 75 (1924).
4 69 A.C. 89, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
5 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714 (West 1954). Every one is responsible, not only for the
result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of
ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as
the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.
The extent of liability in such cases is defined by the Title on Compensatory Relief.
6 69 A.C. at 93, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
T Id. at 100, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
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TiE LAW PRIOR TO ROWLAND
Although Civil Code section 1714 has been on the books since
1872,8 California courts have generally chosen to ignore it and ap-
ply instead the common law distinctions between trespasser, licen-
see, and invitee. The justification for using these rules was that
they provided a more precise test of liability than the reasonable
care requirement of section 1714.1
Trespassers have been protected by the landowner's duty to
merely refrain from wanton or wilful conduct."' Some courts, how-
ever, mitigated the harshness of this rule by adopting the Restate-
ment exception' where the landowner was actively negligent and
knew or had reason to know of the trespasser's presence. 2
Where the entrant is classified as an invitee, the landowner has
been held to a duty of exercising ordinary care." This has been in-
terpreted to mean that he must correct or warn against known
dangers and make reasonable inspection to discover defects not
known. 4
In the case of a licensee, the owner has been subject only to
the duty of refraining from wanton or wilful conduct." In Palmquist
v. Mercer," the California Supreme Court held that a landowner
was not liable for an injury to a licensee resulting from a defective
condition on the premises. There, the plaintiff was injured when he
rode a horse under defendant's trestle which was nearly two and
one half feet lower than authorized. The court stated: "Plaintiff
was obliged to take the premises as he found them insofar as any
alleged defective condition thereon might exist." 7
As a corollary to the rule that a licensee takes the premises as
8 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1954).
9 Note, 13 CALiF. L. REV. 72, 73 (1924).
10 Palmquist v. Mercer, 43 Cal. 2d 92, 272 P.2d 26 (1954).
11 "A possessor of land who knows or has reason to know of the presence of
another who is trespassing on the land is subject to liability for physical harm there-
after caused to the trespasser by the possessor's failure to carry on his activities upon
the land with reasonable care for the trespasser's safety." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS § 336 (1965).
12 Fernandez v. Consolidated Fisheries, Inc., 98 Cal. App. 2d 91, 96-97, 219 P.2d
73, 77 (1950); see, e.g., Marino v. Valenti, 118 Cal. App. 2d 830, 841, 259 P.2d 84,
90 (1953); Fernandez v. American Bridge Co., 104 Cal. App. 2d 340, 345, 231 P.2d
548, 551 (1951).
13 Smith v. Kern County Land Co., 51 Cal. 2d 205, 331 P.2d 645 (1958) ; Miller
v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 204 Cal. App. 2d 160, 22 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1962); 2 B. WrTKIn,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, 1454 (1960).
14 Id.
15 Palmquist v. Mercer, 43 Cal. 2d 92, 102, 272 P.2d 26, 32 (1954).
16 43 Cal. 2d 92, 272 P.2d 26 (1954).
17 Id. at 102, 272 P.2d at 32.
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he finds them, the court in Fisher v. General Petroleum Corpora-
tion,"8 held that defendant did not have a duty to warn a licensee
of a dangerous condition on the land. In this case defendant granted
decedent's employer a license to lay pipe across his land. While
back-filling the trench, deceased struck a bull-plug concealed below
the surface of the earth. Defendant had knowledge of the plug but
failed to warn the employer. Oil and gas were released onto the bull-
dozer which ignited in flames, fatally burning deceased.
This rule, denying recovery for injury occasioned by a defec-
tive condition on the land, has frequently led to unjust results.'9
Consequently, the courts have created an exception to the rule
where they find "active negligence" on the part of the landowner
which, coupled with the defective condition, leads to the plaintiff's
injuries.' The court in Hansen v. Richey2 distinguished between
mere passive negligence, consisting of the owner's maintenance of
a partially filled swimming pool on his premises, and the active
negligence of the owner in entertaining a large number of youthful
guests without providing barriers barring access to the pool.' The
appellate court's reversal was based on what the court termed the
"active conduct" exception.3
Another exception to the traditional rule was recognized in
those instances where a condition on the premises amounts to a
"trap." A trap has been defined as "[A] concealed danger known
to the defendant, that is, a danger clothed with a deceptive appear-
ance of safety." 4 The courts have found a duty to inform the
licensee of a concealed danger where its existence was known to
the landowner.25
It has long been apparent that these common law rules of li-
ability with their limited exceptions and difficulties of application
18 123 Cal. App. 2d 770, 267 P.2d 841 (1954), criticized in Comment, Landowners
and Licensees in California, 7 STAN. L. REV. 130 (1954).
19 Fisher v. General Petroleum Corp., 123 Cal. App. 2d 770, 780, 267 P.2d 841,
847 (1954) (concurring opinion).
20 Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal. 2d 133, 148 P.2d 19 (1944); Howard v. Howard,
186 Cal. App. 2d 622, 9 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1960) ; but cf. Bylling v. Edwards, 193 Cal.
App. 2d 736, 14 Cal. Rptr. 760 (1961).
21 237 Cal. App. 2d 475, 46 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965).
22 Id. at 480-81, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 912-13.
23 Id. at 478, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 911.
24 Id. at 480, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 912; see Nelsen v. Jensen, 177 Cal. App. 2d 270,
2 Cal. Rptr. 180 (1960) ; W. PROSSER, TORTS 390 (3d ed. 1964).
25 Hall v. Barber Door Co., 218 Cal. 412, 23 P.2d 279 (1933). The effectiveness
of the trap exception is limited by a lack of clarity in definition. See, e.g., Anderson v.
Anderson, 251 Cal. App. 2d 409, 412, 59 Cal. Rptr. 342, 344 (1967), where the court
stated that the original meaning of a trap involved the use of spring guns and steel
traps and, "[T]he lack of definiteness in the application of the term to any other
situation makes its use argumentative and unsatisfactory." .
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were ineffective in justly assessing what should be the duty of care
owed to an entrant by a landowner. Realizing the extent to which
these rules had become entrenched in our Anglo-Saxon legal tradi-
tion,26 it was likewise apparent that only an explosive reformation
could permanently lay them to rest. Such an explosion occurred
with the decision of the California Supreme Court in Rowland v.
ChristianY
ROWLAND V. CHRISTIAN
In Rowland, plaintiff was invited into defendant's apartment
and during his visit used defendant's bathroom. In the process of
turning off the water faucet, the porcelain handle broke, severing
tendons in plaintiff's right hand. He brought an action for personal
injuries alleging: That defendant knew of the defective water faucet;
that one month before the accident defendant told her lessors that
the faucet was cracked and should be replaced; and that defendant
did not warn plaintiff of the defect. Defendant moved for summary
judgment, reciting in her supporting affidavit that the plaintiff was
a social guest in her apartment when he was injured. In his counter-
affidavit, plaintiff stated: That defendant knew of the defective
condition; that he had mentioned to defendant his intention to use
the bathroom; and that she failed to warn him of the defective
faucet.
The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment and the court of appeal affirmed. 8 Justice Rattigan, writing
for the appellate court, held that plaintiff's counter-affidavit failed
to show facts sufficient to present a triable issue.29 Since plaintiff
neither denied that he was a social guest nor alleged facts showing
that he enjoyed any other status, it was assumed that he was a social
guest.30 The court said that "[A] licensee takes the premises as he
finds them. The person in possession of the premises is not liable
to him for injury caused by their defective condition."'31 This, of
course, represents the traditional application of the common law
rule. The court recognized the many criticisms directed at the ap-
26 Rowland v. Christian, 69 A.C. 89, 94-95, 443 P.2d 564, 565, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97,
100-101 (1968); see 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS 1432 (1956).
27 69 A.C. 89, 443 P.2d 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
28. Rowland v. Christian, 63 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1967), vacated.
29 Defendant contended that a triable issue of fact existed as to whether the
defective. faucet amounted to a trap but the court held that he could not recover
under any exception to the general rule since he failed to allege that the defective
condition was concealed.
80 Social guest and licensee are used interchangeably. W. PRossa, TORTS 386 (3d
ed. 1964).
81 Rowland v. Christian, 63 Cal. Rptr. 98, 101 (1967), vacated.
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plication of the rule but concluded that "[S]ubstantive law cannot
be changed on the narrow evidentiary base presented by this
record.'
3 2
The supreme court did not agree. In a 5-2 decision, the court
reversed and held that the entrant's status will no longer be de-
terminative of liability, but will be merely one of the factors con-
sidered in deciding whether the defendant breached a duty of
ordinary care and skill in managing his property as set forth by
Civil Code section 1714.3s
The proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land
in accordance with section 1714 of the Civil Code is whether in the
management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view
of the probability of injury to others, and, although the plaintiff's
status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee may in the light of the facts
giving rise to such status have some bearing on the question of liability,
the status is not determinative.3 4
When applying ordinary principles of negligence law rather than
the common law rules, the court found that there was indeed a tri-
able issue of fact: "Where the occupier of land is aware of a con-
cealed condition involving in the absence of precautions an un-
reasonable risk of harm to those coming in contact with it and is
aware that a person on the premises is about to come in contact
with it, the trier of fact can reasonably conclude that a failure to
warn or to repair the condition constitutes negligence." 5
Justice Burke, writing for the dissent, stated that the common
law rules supply workable guidelines and suggested that the reaf-
firmation of negligence principles as determining liability might have
the effect of opening the door to potentially unlimited liability."
ANALYSIS
The Rowland court's rejection of the common law rules in
favor of section 1714 is not totally revolutionary. The courts have
already rejected the law of trespassers, licensees, and invitees in
independent contractor cases37 and in admiralty cases.18 The Row-
32 Id. at 104.
33 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1954).
34 Rowland v. Christian, 69 A.C. 89, 100, 443 P.2d 564, 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97,
104 (1968).
35 Id. at 101, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
386 Id. at 102, 443 P.2d at 569, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 105 (dissenting opinion).
37 Chance v. Lawry's, Inc., 58 Cal. 2d 368, 374 P.2d 185 (1962); Handley v.
Capital Co., 152 Cal. App. 2d 758, 313 P.2d 918 (1957) ; cf. Hall v. Barber Door Co.,
218 Cal. 412, 23 P.2d 279 (1933).
38 Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transtlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630-31 (1958);
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land court itself noted that "[T]he common law distinctions after
thorough study have been repudiated by the jurisdiction of their
birth." 9 Commentators have also repeatedly urged rejection of the
common law distinctions."
With the implementation of section 1714, a general duty of
ordinary care in managing his property is imposed on the land-
owner. However, according to modern California negligence law,
it must be shown that the injury to him was reasonably foreseeable
before this duty will arise in favor of a particular entrant.4 1 This
in turn requires a finding that the particular entrant's presence was
reasonably foreseeable as well as a finding that, given his presence,
he would reasonably be expected to encounter the dangerous con-
dition.
In properly instructing a jury on what the "ordinary duty of
care" to a foreseeable entrant entails, the trial courts of California
may face some knotty problems. True, the problems will be minimal
if the entrant is a business invitee since the duty owed to an invitee
has always been one of ordinary care.42 Thus, the courts will con-
tinue to instruct that the standard of ordinary care owed to an
invitee includes the duty to correct or warn against known dangers
and to make a reasonable inspection to uncover hidden dangers.4
But will the courts continue to instruct that the same duty
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. C/B Mr. Kim, 345 F.2d 45, 50 (5th Cir. 1965);
Olsen v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 341 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1965).
39 69 A.C. 89, 100, 443 P.2d 561, 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104 (1968) ; see Occupier's
Liability Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31 (1957).
40 James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Licensees and
Invitees, 63 YALE L.J. 605 (1954); Note, 22 S. CAL. L. REV. 318 (1949) ; Note, 13
CALIF. L. REV. 72 (1924).
41 This conforms to the modern approach and the California rule that the
general test of negligence is foreseeability, and unless injury to a particular person
could have been foreseen by a reasonably prudent person, the defendant owes no duty
to that particular person. "[TIhe risk reasonably to be foreseen not only creates the
liability but defines its limits." Mosely v. Arden Farms Co., 26 Cal. 2d 213, 220, 157
P.2d 372, 376 (1945) (concurring opinion) ; see also Tucker v. Lombardo, 47 Cal. 2d
457, 464-65, 303 P.2d 1041, 1046 (1956), 2 B. WiTxIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
1404 (1960). The foreseeability test has been suggested in previous cases involving a
trespasser, invitee, or licensee. Palmquist v. Mercer, 43 Cal. 2d 92, 106, 272 P.2d 26,
34 (1954); Fernandez v. American Bridge Co., 104 Cal. App. 2d 340, 344, 231 P.2d 548,
550-51 (1951) ; Fernandez v. Consolidated Fisheries, Inc., 98 Cal. App. 2d 91, 99, 219
P.2d 73, 76-77 (1950). It has been recently applied to cases involving recovery for
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 766, 441 P.2d 912,
69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (foreseeability test applied to recovery for emotional distress) ;
Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 315, 379 P.2d 513, 525 (1963)
(dissenting opinion).
42 Smith v. Kern County Land Co., 51 Cal. 2d 205, 331 P.2d 645 (1958) ; Miller
v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 204 Cal. App. 2d 160, 22 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1962); 2 B. WrTr.tN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, 1454 (1960).
43 Id.
COMMENTS
to inspect is not owed to a trespasser or licensee? In Rowland, the
defendant had actual knowledge of the defective water faucet; thus
the court did not consider the question of whether a duty to inspect
is owed a licensee. The court simply said that the landowner must
exercise "ordinary care" in the management of his property. If a
court were to instruct on general negligence principles, the jury
could properly consider whether, in the exercise of ordinary care,
a duty to inspect had arisen. Whether ordinary care requires an
inspection of the premises depends upon the circumstances of the
particular case, not upon the status of the entrant.
In a situation where the landowner is aware of both the danger-
ous condition and the presence of the entrant, will the trial court
instruct that the standard of ordinary care includes either a duty
to warn or a duty to repair? Rowland strongly suggests that, at the
very least, a failure to warn would constitute negligence: "Whether
or not a guest has a right to expect that his host will remedy danger-
ous conditions on his account, he should reasonably be entitled to
rely upon a warning of the dangerous condition so that he, like the
host, will be in a position to take special precautions when he comes
in contact with it."" While the duty to repair is always an alterna-
tive to the duty to warn, the converse is not always true. However,
it is at least arguable that where a land occupier, under a similar
situation, knows that it is unlikely that he will be available to warn
the entrant or a warning could not be received in time to avoid
possible injury, then his duty becomes one to repair a condition
which involves an unreasonable risk of harm.
The application of negligence principles should not dramatically
increase the burden on the landowner. "Entrant" verdicts that now
appear recoverable under section 1714 were, in many cases, previ-
.ously recoverable under exceptions to the common law rules. For
instance, one of the exceptions to the rule of non-liability for a
licensee's injuries was made when the landowner was "actively
negligent."45 In Anderson v. Anderson,4" the court found a duty to
warn a social guest on the basis of the active negligence of the land-
owner in specifically inviting the plaintiff to use the pool and in
failing to disclose to him a hidden ledge at the bottom. In Rowland,
the court suggests that the "ordinary care" now owed to a social
guest would likely include a similar duty to warn against dangerous
conditions known to the land owner. In Anderson, the court was
44 69 A.C. at 101, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
45 Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal. 2d 133, 148 P.2d 19 (1944) ; Howard v. Howard,
186 Cal. App. 2d 622, 9 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1960); but cf., Bylling v. Edwards, 193 Cal.
App. 2d 732,14 Cal. Rptr. 760 (1961).
46 251 Cal. App. 2d 409, 59 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1967).
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forced to talk in terms of the separate "active negligence" of the
landowner coupled with the failure to warn in order to find li-
ability. Today, a similar result will be reached by simply recognizing
that allowing a social guest to be exposed to a dangerous condition
without a warning is failing to conform to a standard of ordinary
care.
Where the entrant was a trespasser, the common law required
only that the landowner refrain from wanton or wilful conduct.4"
However, under the Rowland rationale, where a trespasser's pres-
ence is known, the landowner's duty of ordinary care in the man-
agement of his property would attach if a reasonable person would
have foreseen that the trespasser would be exposed to an unreason-
able risk of harm. This would appear to be a rather extreme de-
parture from prior California law were it not for the fact that some
of California's lower courts seem to have anticipated the supreme
court. In Fernandez v. Consolidated Fisheries Incorporated,5 the
appellate court reversed on the ground that the instruction that the
only duty to a trespasser is to refrain from wilful acts was error 9.4
The court based its decision on Civil Code section 1714 and held
that the jury should determine whether defendant knew of the plain-
tiff's presence. 0 If he did have such knowledge, he must exercise
ordinary care under the circumstances.
The common law rule relating to trespassers contained one
notable exception, the attractive nuisance doctrine. The doctrine re-
quires the exercise of ordinary care in the case where the trespasser
was a child of sufficient youth to be enticed onto the land by the
dangerous condition." Generally, the dangerous condition has to be
47 Fernandez v. Consolidated Fisheries, Inc., 98 Cal. App. 2d 91, 96-97, 219
P.2d 73, 77; see, e.g., Marino v. Valenti, 118 Cal. App. 2d 830, 259 P.2d 84 (1953);
Fernandez v. American Bridge Co., 104 Cal. App. 2d 340, 345, 231 P.2d 548, 551
(1951).
48 98 Cal. App. 2d 91, 219 P.2d 73 (1950). Justice Peters has been in the van-
guard of those who espouse the return to common law principles of negligence. Dillon
v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 766, 441 P.2d 912 (1968); Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply
Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 315, 379 P.2d 513, 525 (1963) (dissenting opinion) ; Fernandez v.
Consolidated Fisheries, Inc., 98 Cal. App. 2d 91, 219 P.2d 73 (1950).
49 Id. at 99, 219 P.2d at 78.
50 Id.
51 Under the attractive nuisance doctrine, a landowner is liable for injuries to a
trespassing child as stated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or TORTS § 339 (1965), which
is the law in California: "A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm
to children trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the land if
(a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor
knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and
(b) the condition - is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to
know and which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable
risk of death or serious bodily injury to such children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or real-
ize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming within the area
made dangerous by it, and
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so uncommon, concealed, and highly dangerous that a child of a
particular age would not, recognize the peril. 2 By implementing the
ordinary care standard of section 1714, Rowland merely reaffirms
the basis of this doctrine.
53
While the rules incident to Rowland remain to be formulated,
some practical effects may be forecast.
By retaining the status of trespasser, licensee, and invitee as
one of the factors in determining liability under Civil Code section
1714, the court is providing a workable guideline based on a con-
sideration of foreseeability. The revised California Jury Instructions,
based on the Rowland decision, implement this foreseeability con-
sideration in the determination of the duty of an owner or occupant
of premises:
The [owner] [occupant] of premises is under a duty to exercise
ordinary care in the management of such premises in order to avoid
exposing persons thereon to an unreasonable risk of harm. A failure
to fulfill this duty would be negligence. [This duty of care is owed
only to such persons as the [owner] [occupant], as a reasonably pru-
dent person under the same or similar circumstances, should have
foreseen would be exposed to such a risk of harm.] 54
Where, for instance, the plaintiff is a customer in defendant's
store, there would normally be no question of foreseeability unless
the customer entered an area where he could no longer enjoy the
status of an invitee. Since the duty is one to inspect as well as warn
or repair,55 the main consideration, in determining liability in the
absence of a warning to the plaintiff, is whether the condition ex-
isted for such a length of time that a reasonable inspection would
have disclosed it. If, however, the entrant is a trespasser or licensee,
the foreseeability of his presence goes directly to the question of
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the burden
of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the risk to children in-
volved, and
(e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or
otherwise to protect the children.
See, e.g., Courteil v. McEachen, 51 Cal. 2d 448, 457-58, 334 P.2d 870, 875 (1959);
Reynolds v. Wilson, 51 Cal. 2d 94, 103, 331 P.2d 48, 51-52 (1958).
52 The requirement as construed by Dean Prosser that "[slome possibility of
danger, not unreasonably great, is not enough . . . ." is recognized as establishing
a policy of recovery limited to uncommon, concealed, highly dangerous conditions of
the land over and above the common, obvious dangers known to children of a par-
ticular age. W. PROSSER, TORTS 441 (2d ed. 1955).
53 The basis of the attractive nuisance doctrine, as interpreted by Dean Prosser,
is that the child, due to his immaturity and want of judgment, may be incapable of
understanding and appreciating all of the possible dangers which he may encounter in
trespassing, or of making his own intelligent decisions as to the chances he will take.
W. PROSSER, TORTS 372 (3d ed. 1964).
54 CAL. JUR. INST. Civ. No. 211-A (Revised 1968).
55 See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
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duty. Should the land owner or occupier expect that particular
plaintiff to be on his land at that particular time? If so, should
he reasonably expect the entrant to encounter that particular
defective condition? It is to be noted that the revised jury in-
structions define the defective condition as involving an unrea-
sonable risk of harm and require the jury to answer, in part,
whether the risk of harm was one which a reasonable person should
anticipate at all or would commonly disregard. 56
CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court could have resolved the contro-
versy in Rowland v. Christian by following traditional California
law. However, the court took the opportunity presented by Rowland
to discard confusing and inflexible rules based on historical con-
siderations and to replace them with principles of duty flexible
enough to meet the needs of our modern society.
Under the old rules, the entrant's status determined the ques-
tion of duty and liability. With Rowland, status is relegated to one
of the factors which may be considered in limiting the duty but
not defining it. The duty is to exercise ordinary care in the man-
agement of one's property regardless of whether the entrant is a
trespasser, licensee, or invitee.
The Rowland decision in the light of Dillon v. Legg 7 decided
by this same court in March of 1968, reflects a trend in modernizing
antiquated tort law to conform with a determination of liability
based on general principles of negligence and foreseeability. Yet,
the court has overturned many years of traditional law and the en-
suing effect on such factors as insurance and trial tactics remains
to be seen. The Rowland rationale is no novelty in California law.
As early as 1924, a commentator noted:
After all, this branch of law is really a specialization of the law of
negligence. The code does not require the distinction between tres-
passer, licensee, and invitee; the courts are free to proceed on the
general doctrine of negligence. And, in applying the law to the particular
case a determination may often be more easily reached by asking
whether the owner has exercised reasonable care under the circum-
stances, than by asking whether the visitor is a trespasser, licensee, or
invitee, and whether the owner has exercised that degree of care which
should be shown the particular class in which he is placed. 58
Gary T. Shara
56 CAL. JUR. INST. Civ. No. 211-A.1 (New 1968).
57 68 Cal. 2d 766, 441 P.2d 912 (1968) (foreseeability test applied to recovery for
emotional distress).
58 Note, 13 CAuiF. L. REV. 72, 75 (1924).
